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Everyday surveillance, Goffman, and unfocused interaction 
 
Louise Eley & Ben Rampton 
 
King’s College London 
 
Abstract 
 
It is often said that surveillance has massively transformed our social lives (Lyon, 
Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1), but this claim is weakened by the admission that its “effects 
are difficult to isolate or observe, as they are embedded within many normal aspects of 
daily life” (ibid.). Picking up the analytic challenge, this paper investigates the everyday 
interactional practice and experience of being surveilled, and to do so, it draws on 
Goffman’s account of the interaction order, dwelling closely on unfocused interaction, in 
which people maintain a side-of-the-eye, half-an-ear awareness of the people, objects, and 
events in the space around them. After introducing key concepts from Goffman, the paper 
discusses three scenes of surveillance: a woman walking down a city street, two men 
putting up street stickers (a civil offence), and passengers being scanned at an airport 
(Pütz 2012). It shows how different senses of potential threat and illegality enter the 
experience of surveillance, and it builds a rudimentary model. The paper considers only a 
tiny fraction of contemporary surveillance, but it shows Goffman’s value as an analytic 
resource that can hold large-scale generalisations about the surveillance society to 
account, allowing us to see agentive responses to surveillance that are too subtle to be 
captured by notions like subversion and resistance. Indeed, Goffman corroborates Green 
and Zurawski’s (2015) suggestion that surveillance is a basic mode of the social, 
elaborated in different ways in different environments.  
 
 
According to the first page of the Routledge Handbook of Surveillance Studies (Ball, 
Haggerty, and Lyon (eds.) 2012), contemporary developments in surveillance have produced 
“social changes in the dynamics of power, identity, institutional practice and interpersonal 
relations on a scale comparable to the changes brought by industrialization, globalization or 
the historical rise of urbanization” (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1). And yet there are 
empirical uncertainties: “[the] eﬀects [of surveillance] are diﬃcult to isolate and observe, as 
they are embedded within many normal aspects of daily life” (ibid.: 1; also 9). Comparably, 
Green and Zurawski argue from an anthropological perspective that surveillance studies tends 
to operate with an “a priori categorization of what constitutes surveillance,” treating 
“surveillance as so large, and such a complex set of processes, that it can best be researched 
and understood through its systems and structures, at the expense of attention to 
embeddedness in everyday life” (2015: 31; see also Ball 2002, 2005, 2009; Ball and 
Wilson 2000; Ball et al. 2015).   
 In sociolinguistics, our own (sub-)discipline, there is a long tradition of ethnographic 
work that examines power, ideology, and social change in everyday communicative 
practice. This covers class, ethnicity, sexuality, gender, generation, etc. across a host of 
sites (including homes, communities, schools, workplaces, clinics, mass and new media). So 
in principle, sociolinguistics ought to be able to contribute to the studies of everyday 
surveillance relations advocated by Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball and Green and Zurawski, 
particularly if surveillance is an interactional relationship between watcher and watched, as 
many suggest. But somewhat remarkably, there is very little sociolinguistic research on 
surveillance (see however Jones 2015, 2017; Rampton 2016, 2017: 11-12; Lyon, 
Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 6).  
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 To understand everyday experiences of being surveilled, the ambient monitoring that 
everyone engages in as a routine matter-of-course provides one obvious starting point. 
This is the kind of side-of-the-eye, half-an-ear awareness of other people, objects, and 
events that we rely on wherever we go, and there is a detailed account of how it operates 
in social situations in Erving Goffman’s work on unfocused interaction – the interaction 
that occurs between people who are physically co-present but engaged in separate 
activities, focusing on different things. In studies of surveillance, Goffman is sometimes 
brought into descriptions of the surreptitious practices with which people in subordinate 
positions transgress, resist, or otherwise adjust to rules and regimes that they are unable 
or unwilling to follow to the letter (e.g. Jacobs and Miller 1998; Collinson 1999; Helten 
and Fischer 2004: 343; Ball 2005: 96, 102; Simon 2005: 6-8; Cherbonneau and Copes 
2006; Lyon 2007: 82, 166-7; Smith 2007: 290, 302, 308; Gilliom and Monahan 2012: 
409; Marx 2009: 299). But notions like “by-standing” and “civil inattention” – key 
elements in unfocused interaction – hardly feature. In sociolinguistics, Goffman has had 
a huge influence, providing concepts that are now accepted as basic to the description of 
communicative interaction. But both here and in adjacent fields of communication 
research, the overwhelming emphasis has been on what Goffman calls ‘focused 
interaction,’ in which people do things together, rather than on people carrying out 
independent activities in each other’s presence.1   
So in what follows, we first outline Goffman’s conception of the interaction order, and 
then within that, unfocused interaction, a notion that treats surveillance-like activity as 
inextricably bound into everyday social life everywhere, regardless of the institutional 
domain (Jones 2017: 170) (sec. 1). In the three sections after that, we bring out the links to 
surveillance commonly understood as “the focused, systematic and routine attention to 
personal details for purposes of influence, management, protection or direction” (Lyon 2007: 
14). Section 2 examines a video recording of a woman’s brief walk down the street from one 
shop to another, and it shows how ambient monitoring, a relatively relaxed demeanour, and 
institutional surveillance are closely interwoven, contributing to the normalisation of 
surveillance. Section 3 shifts to two men who engage in the (mildly) illegal practice of 
posting up stickers, and uses data from participant observation and interviews to bring out 
differences in their sense of the risks from surveillance, drawing on Goffman to attempt a 
more systematic account of thought and action at the point of committing an offence under 
surveillance. A rudimentary model emerges which is then elaborated in a brief discussion of 
the interactions with surveillance technology described in Ole Pütz’s (2012) study of airport 
scanning (sec. 4). In the final section, we summarise the analysis and consider its 
                                                             
1 In ethnomethodological and conversation analytic micro-sociology, there is a growing body 
of work that uses video-recordings to look at how people interact on the move in public 
places (visiting museums, walking, driving, cycling), but intentional communication remains 
the central concern, whether this is person-to-person or mediated by material texts or objects 
(Kendon 1990; Mondada 2009, 2016: 347ff.; McIlvenny, Broth, and Haddington 2014; 
Haddington and Raunioma 2014; but see Ryave and Schenkein 1974; Hindmarsh, Heath et al. 
2001: 18-19; vom Lehn, Heath, and Hindmarsh 2001: 203-207; Haddington et al. 2012; 
Liberman 2013). In sociolinguistics, there is also a body of research that examines public 
signage in ‘Linguistic Landscapes,’ and this now extends beyond the analysis of verbal and 
visual text to a view of how people interact around signs, moving through space (Scollon and 
Scollon 2003). This is certainly one significant source of nascent sociolinguistic interest in 
surveillance (Eley 2019; Jones 2017; Kitis and Milani 2015; Stroud and Jegels 2014), but 
even so, the potential significance of Goffman’s account of unfocused interaction for 
understanding surveillance remains largely unexplored. 
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implications for understanding surveillance and social change, the politics of surveillance, 
and for the theorisation of surveillance itself. 
 Methodologically, our discussion is offered as an interdisciplinary contribution to 
opening up the everyday interactional experience of being surveilled (Ball 2009: 640). In the 
cumulative process of comparative analysis that informs our (modest) theory-building, we 
draw on different types of data (audio-video recordings, participant observation, interviews) 
and different studies, not just our own. The only technical vocabulary we use is Goffman’s 
(bolding the first use of terms which are especially significant in our analyses), and this is 
treated as a framework of “sensitising constructs,” which “suggest directions along which to 
look” rather than “definitive” concepts which “provide prescriptions of what to see” (Blumer 
1969: 148). In this way, we seek to contribute to ethnographic “research on the constitution 
of surveillance relations and processes in everyday life” (Green and Zurawski 2015: 38).2   
With this view of the paper’s scope and limitations in place, we should now turn to a 
sketch of the interaction order, within that concentrating on unfocused interaction.  
 
 
1. Goffman, the interaction order, and unfocused interaction 
 
Goffman’s oeuvre roams across a plurality of empirical and documentary sources 
developing a rather coherent, cumulative career-long project of analytic distillation, 
focusing on what he came to call the interaction order (1983). This involves the very 
basic structural arrangements, forms of attention, and ritual sensitivities that arise 
whenever individuals are physically co-present, and his argument is that this underpins 
social activity everywhere. The interaction order is certainly always clothed in the kinds 
of cultural and institutional particularity that ethnographies describe, and these 
particularities have to be addressed in any empirical analysis of the interaction order.  
But Goffman insisted that the interaction order is only “loosely coupled” with 
institutional systems, roles and relationships, social statuses (age-grade, gender, class, 
etc.), cultural styles, and so forth (what he called “social structure” (1983: 2)), and as a 
result, the framework of concepts he developed is unaffected by “standard [sociological] 
contrast[s] between village life and city life, between domestic settings and public ones, 
between intimate, long-standing relations and fleeting impersonal ones” (1983: 2). 
The interaction order has a “body to body starting point,” and it comes into operation 
in “environments in which two or more individuals are physically in one another’s… 
presence,” whether they are on their own (singles) or in company (in withs) (1983: 2). 
“When individuals come into one another’s immediate presence,” says Goffman, “territories 
of the self bring to the scene a vast filigree of wires which individuals are uniquely equipped 
to trip over” (1971: 135-6). These territories cover a variety of preserves – our bodies, our 
personal space, our possessions, our reputations, the information about us (1971: chap. 2) – 
and in one another’s presence, we “become vulnerable [not only] to physical assault, sexual 
                                                             
2 We recognise that surveillance takes many forms (Green and Zurawski 2015: 29; 
Walby 2005: 158; Haggerty 2006) and at least two dimensions of surveillance that fall 
outside our concerns here: ‘dataveillance’ and the administrative design and management of 
information about individuals (Simon 2005: 4; van Dijck 2013; Lyon 2007: 23), and the 
surveillance that is pervasive in focused interactional encounters with bureaucracy (cf. Ball et 
al. 2015). Some observations about these can be found in Rampton and Eley 2018 (notes 28 
and 31), together with a discussion of how our account of (un)focused interaction could be 
extended to the activity of official surveillers (2018: appendix).  
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molestation, kidnapping, robbery and obstruction of movement,” but also “through their 
words and gesticulation to the penetration of our psychic preserves, and to the breaching of 
the expressive order we expect will be maintained in our presence” (1983: 4). A good deal of 
co-presence involves focused interaction, which, prototypically, arises when ratified 
participants come together “in a consciously shared, clearly interdependent undertaking, the 
period of participation itself bracketed with rituals of some kind” (1981: 7). But it also 
extends to activities in which talk plays a secondary role like “card games, service 
transactions,” etc. (1983: 7); activities involving an audience and platform format (plays, 
movies, formal meetings, etc.) (ibid.); quite large-scale celebratory occasions (ibid.); and to 
mediated communication such as “telephonic connection and letter exchange” (1983: 6). In 
all these settings, participants “share a joint focus of attention, perceive that they do so, and 
perceive this perceiving” (1983: 3).    
But the interaction order also involves the presence of people (either as singles or withs) 
who are engaged in adjacent activity within visual range but beyond the circle in which one is 
principally occupied. Goffman calls this unfocused interaction. When individuals 
participate in focused and unfocused interaction simultaneously, orienting both to “ratified 
participants” inside particular conversational enclosures and bystanders within range (who 
may simply overhear parts of the talk or actively listen in as eavesdroppers (1981: 131ff.)), 
their attention is necessarily divided. As well as being involved in the talk or task that is the 
main focus for ratified participants, they remain alert to the wider field of “communication in 
the round” and particularly in gatherings and public places, they may scan the surroundings 
out of the corner of their eye, checking that there is nothing nearby to alarm them (1971: 
chap. 1). Both within and beyond the project or encounter in which they are principally 
engaged, people notice but actively disattend objects and activities that can be safely ignored 
(1974: chap. 7; 1981: 132), although this distribution of involvement can shift, either 
gradually or suddenly, so that a person changes from “placidly attending to easily managed 
matters at hand” to being “fully mobilised, alarmed, ready to attack… or flee” (1971: 282; 
1981: 101-4). Within the mutual monitoring environments that constitute unfocused 
interaction, people also usually design their own behaviour and appearance in ways that 
display to others that they’re not a threat themselves. As well as being able to “transmit” 
linguistic signs in talk, people “exude” information through their body idiom, which is open 
to interpretation by anyone within perceptual range (1970: 5-11; 1963: 33-35). In addition, 
“this kind of controlled alertness to the situation will [often] mean suppressing or concealing 
many of the capacities and roles the individual might be expected to play in other settings” 
(1963: 24-25), and there are a host of “involvement shields” “behind which individuals can 
safely do the kinds of things that ordinarily result in negative sanctions” – pieces of furniture, 
objects, items of clothing, etc. (1963: 39ff.; 1971: 344-5).   
 
 
Figure 1: Focused and unfocused interaction 
  
Focused interaction between A & B Unfocused interaction between C, D & A+B 
 
Key: ↔ : mutually ratified & reciprocated attention 
- - - - : ambient awareness 
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As well as observing these situational proprieties in their own body idiom, participants 
usually collaborate in the maintenance of a normative “communication traffic order” (1963: 
24), and much of the time they do so through civil inattention. In civil inattention, “one 
gives to another enough visual notice to demonstrate that one appreciates that the other is 
present…, while at the next moment withdrawing one’s attention from [him/her] so as to 
express that [s/he] does not constitute a target of special curiosity or design” (1963: 84). But 
occasions do arise when civil inattention is abandoned. For a variety of reasons 
(acquaintanceship, business, etc.), someone may seek to transition from unfocused interaction 
to a face-to-face encounter, displaying to the person they’re approaching that they’re no 
threat with an access ritual like a greeting. Alternatively, some violation of situational 
propriety may occur – someone steps on a toe, talks too loudly, or drops something – and this 
can instigate either a remedial ritual, which involves a variable sequence of interactive 
moves like “primes” (“oi!”), explanations, apologies, remedies, appreciations (“thanks”), and 
minimisations (“no problem”), or alternatively, a “run-in” if for example the source of the 
infraction pointedly refuses to provide a remedy (1971: chap. 4; 1967). There are also “non-
persons” – for example, children, servants, and animals – who don’t observe situational 
proprieties and aren’t accorded civil inattention (1963: 40, chap. 5), and there are others in 
opening positions, like police officers, who have “a built-in license to accost others” (1963: 
129). 
In summary, unfocused interaction involves: 
  
a) perceiving other people’s activity from the outside, without being a ratified co-
participant in the talk or task they are engaged in, and assuming that they are also 
aware of you;  
b) styling your appearance and bodily conduct in non-threatening ways, broadly in 
accordance with the proprieties of the situation; 
c) actively displaying civil inattention and a respect for the boundaries around the joint 
activity of “withs” and the territories of the selves of “singles”;  
d) only shifting into a focused encounter with an access ritual that provides reassurance 
that the approach is non-threatening, or if some un-ignorable infraction is jeopardising 
situational proprieties.   
 
There are a lot more subtleties in Goffman’s work, but this initial sketch should be sufficient 
to show that he sees unfocused interaction and the ambient monitoring it entails as an 
ineradicable aspect of our behaviour in social situations. How, though, is ambient monitoring 
in unfocused interaction linked with experiences of surveillance, defined as “the focused, 
systematic and routine attention to personal details for purposes of influence, management, 
protection or direction” (Lyon 2007: 14)?   
We will explore this in the rest of the paper, and use the resources that Goffman provides to 
address their connection in everyday experience, beginning with data from Eley’s fieldwork 
in the streets of Frankfurt. 
 
 
2.    Walking in a street and the normalisation of surveillance  
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Eley’s doctoral ethnography developed an interactional perspective on the regulation, 
perception, and emplacement of signage in a large public thoroughfare in Frankfurt,3 and the 
analysis here focuses on a 3 minute 52 second audio-video recording of a woman leaving one 
shop, going out into the street in search of another, seeing it, and then crossing the road to go 
into it – all in all, a process that would be hard to beat in terms of day-to-day mundanity 
(Green and Zurawski 2015: 40). As such, it is a good test of our ability to document some 
lived experience of unfocused interaction with Goffman as a guide, and in what follows, we 
will consider the woman’s humming and general demeanour, different types of ambient 
attention, and fleeting experience of the city traffic police, which we recorded with a tiny 
audio-visual device built into the spectacles that the woman was wearing. Here is a sketch of 
the background and the main actions recorded on the video. 
 
Background: It’s around 3pm on Friday in mid-March. The walker (henceforth “Inge”) is 
a middle-aged white German woman, who lived for several years in Turkey and speaks 
Turkish. She lives outside the neighbourhood, but likes to visit it from time to time, when 
“I’ll run a few errands. I’ll go to Her Şey [a kiosk (not its real name)], chat with [the 
owner]. Buy fruit. The usual. Drink tea” (taken from Eley’s conversation with Inge about 
her plans before she set off wearing the video glasses). But Inge hasn’t been in the 
neighbourhood for a while, and is looking for Her Şey because “every time I look for Her 
Şey, I [can] never find it.” She starts wearing the video glasses at around 3pm and stops at 
around 4pm. A video-replay discussion takes place immediately afterwards.4   
 
Broad outline of actions:  
27.42: Inge starts to leave the Turkish bookshop with her purchase and begins humming 
softly as she moves to the door. (Inge hummed when walking on other occasions 
during Eley’s fieldwork, including when walking with Eley without the video-
glasses.) 
27.46: turns left onto the pavement and walks along it, humming 
28.28: crosses a side road (without stopping humming) 
28.46: briefly interrupts humming to comment on an Indian bakery with papered up 
windows: “Oh it’s closed or something. Gosh!” Then resumes 
29.12: moves closer to the left to the shop window and slows down for 4 seconds in front 
of a display of Turkish books and CDs 
29.26 and 29.37: Inge has been looking across to the opposite side of the main road from 
time to time (28.52 – 29.02) and continues to do so later (29.58 – 30.00; 30.10 – 
30.14), but now she stops and looks across the road for 5 seconds and then again 
for 8 seconds at a small shop missing a shop front sign displaying its name, with 4 
men standing outside (still humming) (Inge during replay: “there I’m looking for 
Her Şey”). Then carries on walking (and humming) 
30.03: comments looking up at a shop: “This is new here. Okay?” Resumes humming 
30.23: approaches a second side road, glances left twice at a small cluster of men (two in 
city traffic police uniforms), momentarily stopping the humming during the first 
glance (see below). Crosses the side road (humming again) 
30.40: moves to the right of the pavement, and while looking up and down the main road, 
says: “((unclear word)) there seen it” 
                                                             
3 Eley 2019; see also Scollon and Scollon 2003; Blommaert 2013; Jones 2017; Stroud and 
Jegels 2014 
4 Eley wasn’t in audio contact with Inge during the walk, and did not follow her. 
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30.43: crosses the main road (humming until she reaches approximately half-way, 
resuming when she reaches the pavement) 
31.05: slows down as she approaches Her Şey’s shop front, which is covered with stickers 
and posters, and stops humming 
31.09: stops walking for nearly 20 seconds to read a poster stuck to the wall outside, 
going close up to one (no humming) 
31.28: moves along towards the shop door (resuming humming)  
31.30: turns right through the door, sees the shop-owner close at hand, and slips straight 
from humming to a greeting 
 
There are important clues to Inge’s shifts of attention and experience of the surroundings in 
the humming that she keeps up for most of the walk, stopping at particular moments, and 
Goffman facilitates three observations.   
First, Goffman sees humming as a “side involvement,” one among a number of activities 
that “an individual can carry on in an abstracted fashion without threatening or confusing 
simultaneous maintenance of a main involvement... Humming while working and knitting 
while listening are examples” (Goffman 1963: 43, 70; Rampton 2006: chap. 3). This fits the 
video: Inge’s main involvement is finding Her Şey, but she drops her humming when she 
refers out loud to changes that she notices (the shops that have closed and opened since her 
last visit [28.46, 30.03]), as well as when she stops outside Her Şey to look at a poster (31.09) 
– in other words, she stops humming when particular things catch or require her closer 
attention. Second, whereas full-voiced singing would draw attention, the softness of her 
humming is consistent with situational propriety and the display of civil inattention. This kind 
of private orientation to music (and other auditory artefacts) involves an “inward migration 
from the gathering”: “[w]hile outwardly participating in an activity within a social situation, 
an individual can allow his attention to turn from what he and everyone else considers the 
real or serious world, and give himself up for a time to a playlike world in which he alone 
participates” (1963: 69). Third, Inge’s humming suggests that she feels relatively safe in the 
street, presupposing an environment that doesn’t demand full alertness, where she can 
“placidly attend to easily managed matters at hand” (1971: 282). There is, though, one 
episode relevant to institutional surveillance when this situation seems marginally less stable. 
As Inge approaches the second side road, a man, who has just crossed it and is walking 
towards her, briefly turns his head right to look down the side road (30.18, see Figure 2), 
looks ahead again, and then glances back once more (30.19). He passes Inge on the inside of 
the pavement, and then as she moves closer to the corner with a view down the side road, she 
also turns her head to look down the side road. A group of three men standing and talking 
come into view, one of them behind a pedestrian barrier (30.22, see Figure 3). Two are in city 
traffic police uniforms, one with arms folded (behind the barrier), the other with hands held 
behind his back, while the un-uniformed man has his hands in his pockets. Another 
pedestrian, who had been walking ahead of Inge and has turned down the side street, can be 
seen glancing back in the direction of the group. As the threesome comes into view, Inge 
stops humming for about 2 seconds (30.22-24). She then resumes the tune, turns her head 
back to the direction she’s going (to avoid the bollard ahead 30.26), but then looks back down 
the side-street once more for a couple of seconds, with the group of three to the left of her 
vision. After that, she turns her head back in the direction she’s going, humming and walking 
forward across the side road.   
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Figure 2: Oncoming pedestrian turning head right to look down side road (circled in blue)  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: The scene recorded by the video-glasses at the moment when Inge is turning her 
head down the side-street and stops humming. (The two uniformed men are circled in blue, 
the un-uniformed man in white, and the pedestrian glancing back in yellow.) 
 
 
 
 
So what can we learn from all this about ambient monitoring and experiences of 
surveillance in unfocused interaction? To answer, we can first focus on the walker, turning to 
studies of surveillance afterwards.   
The video we’ve described lasts less than four minutes, but it provides quite a rich socio-
cognitive view of Inge’s fluctuating and multi-track attention to the circumstances around her 
(cf. Goffman 1974: chap. 7). Her overall intention is to locate and reach Her Şey, and the 
video captures her actively looking, walking forwards, and from time to time scanning the 
opposite side of the road, at one point stopping for over 10 seconds to look more closely 
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(29.26 and 29.37). There are also moments of noticing when she slows down (29.12; 31.05), 
stops (31.09), or comments (28.46; 30.03; 30.40) near things that catch her attention and 
speak to her cultural interests (in Turkish culture, in the poster at the kiosk which she thought 
was advertising a reading/exhibition, in the changing neighbourhood). For much of the time, 
she is “away” in the tune that she is humming, although she does this in a way that displays 
respect for the situation (1974: 345). In fact, she passes more than 20 pedestrians coming 
towards her on the pavement without any problem, and in doing so, she employs a 
“dissociated vigilance” that “provide[s] a running reading of the situation, a constant 
monitoring of what surrounds… out of the further corner [of the] eye, leaving the individual 
[her]self free to focus [her] main attention on the non-emergencies around [her]” (1971: 282).  
Of course the passers-by also contribute to avoiding collision, mutually monitoring and 
adjusting their own paths as well (Goffman 1971: 28; Ryave and Schenkein 1974; 
Haddington et al. 2012: para. 40-42, 47).   
But beyond the different kinds of (often simultaneous) awareness displayed in Inge’s 
practices, what about her experience of organised institutional surveillance? There is a non-
smoking sign on the door of the bookshop that she leaves, and as Jones notes, this implies 
that “someone… is watching… to make sure that [customers] do not engage in these 
prohibited activities” (2017: 154). But in the recording, it appears only very briefly at the 
edge of the screen – Inge doesn’t appear to pay any attention to this on the video (and doesn’t 
light up when she gets outside). Nor does she look up at any of the CCTV cameras that she 
passes.5 It is most likely that both types of surveillance are just taken-for-granted, but this is 
not quite the case with the two uniformed employees of the city traffic police she passes, 
even though their “opening position” means that they might also be taken for granted. Here it 
looks as though she is alerted to something non-normal by the two rightward glances of the 
pedestrian coming towards her, and she appears to pay greater attention to the scene with the 
traffic police when she glances towards the group for 4 seconds (30.22 – 30.26), momentarily 
stops humming (30.22 – 30.24), and then looks back for two seconds as she moves past 
(30.26 – 30.29). But that’s it. The body idiom of the three men suggests nothing untoward 
(arms folded, hands clasped behind back, hands in pockets); “as the individual moves, some 
potential signs for alarm move out of effective range (as their sources move out of 
relevance)” (Goffman 1971: 301); and “the actions of passers-by form a chain of embodied 
events that signal and help maintain normalcy” (Haddington et al. 2012: para. 35) – the 
oncoming pedestrian whose sideways glancing Inge copied didn’t look unduly concerned, 
and nor does anyone else. All in all, the official surveillance supported by organisations here 
seems to be inextricably interwoven with the routine practices of unfocused interaction that 
everyone performs in Inge’s vicinity.  
If we turn to the literature in surveillance studies, this account of the subjective 
experience of surveillance is very broadly compatible with the phenomenological approach 
suggested by Friesen, Feenberg, and Smith (2009) and Ball (2005: 96-98, following Crossley 
1995, 2001), addressing “lived space, lived time, lived body, lived human relations” and “a-
thematic consciousness” (“awareness that is not intellectual, interpretive or deciphering”) 
(Friesen, Feenberg, and Smith 2009: 85, 88). But as an empirical method, the introspectively 
generated narratives that Friesen, Feenberg, and Smith recommend are unlikely to be able to 
capture the synchronised interplay of physical movement, built environment, body idiom, 
gaze, and vocalisation recorded in the 10 seconds of video in which Inge oriented to (non-
)events with traffic police down the side-street. Indeed, more generally, the narratives 
produced in interviews are likely to have quite serious limitations as sources of insight into 
                                                             
5 Judging from Eley’s photographs of the street, there are at least three CCTV cameras that 
she walks past. 
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the lived experience of surveillance. This is because narratives tend to dwell on what’s 
tellable (and often a little bit more dramatic), thereby missing the mundane unremarkable-
ness of surveillance in a scene like the one that Inge experienced during her walk (cf. Green 
and Zurawski 2015: 28, 31). And yet it is essential to address this humdrum ordinariness if 
we are interested in the normalisation of surveillance (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1). In 
fact, the combination of Goffman and an audio-video recording like this allows us to 
spotlight the very practices with which the normality of surveillance is produced and 
maintained – mid-afternoon on a Friday for Inge.   
 But of course our account has been closely tuned to the experience of one particular 
person, a respectable middle-aged woman. The links we’ve made to Goffman show that our 
case isn’t utterly idiosyncratic, but even so, experiences of surveillance differ considerably, 
and it is worth now turning to a case study of two people with everyday interests that bring 
them closer to the borders of legality. In the process, we will develop another angle on how 
surveillance is experienced, and start to build a model to represent this. 
 
 
3. Posting up stickers and the experience of feeling surveilled 
 
It is a civil offence in Frankfurt to post up stickers (small pieces of adhesive material carrying 
text and/or images) in the street, and the local authorities and public transport operators 
employ cleaners to take them down. Eley’s PhD fieldwork included a number of individuals 
and groups who regularly put up stickers in the neighbourhood she was researching (which 
also had more CCTV cameras than any other part of the city). While some engaged in 
stickering for fun, because they liked particular stickers and enjoyed seeing interesting or 
amusing ones around, others used them in social, political, and commercial projects that they 
were committed to, and their stickers carried messages about welcoming migrants, new 
musical outlets, and so forth (cf. Eley 2019). In both categories, people said that they liked to 
have some stickers ready in their pockets whenever they went into the streets. We didn’t 
video anyone placing stickers, but we asked about and/or observed the process, and it is 
worth comparing what two of them told us. 
Adnan was in his late twenties, was born in Turkey, came to Germany as a child, now ran 
a small business, and put up stickers if he liked the political message or found them 
entertaining. Talking about putting up stickers on trains, he said:  
 
Yeah because vandalism is anti-social ((laughs)). It’s vandalism vis-à-vis the City… 
There are cameras everywhere... Yeah or ticket inspectors are there (translated from 
German).   
 
And he explained how he actually posted them up:  
 
Just like that, put it in your hand... Sticker is here, you hold it so like ((bends fingers 
inwards to cup hand, traces with other hand the rectangle shape of the sticker)) you take 
the backing away and ((stretches arm out as if leaning with hand against surface))… 
Looks as though it was already there (translated from German).  
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Figure 4: Preparing to place a sticker covertly (not demonstrated by Adnan) 
 
 
 
 
In Goffman’s terms, Adnan was using his hand as an “involvement shield,” concealing the 
sticker and disguising his action as a mundane stretch or lean.   
James, also in his twenties, was born in the UK but spent a lot of time growing up abroad.  
During a stay in Frankfurt he became increasingly involved in a third sector organisation and 
remained in the city, supporting himself by working as a waiter. His stickers promoted the 
work, projects, and politics of the organisation, and when we asked him about stickering, he 
said:   
 
no I don’t care about cameras. a lot of people care about cameras, I don’t... like I don’t 
think anybody is gonna look at a camera twenty-four hours. and even if they see 
somebody sticker something they’re like okay. like if you go graffiti something maybe be 
a bit more wary. but a sticker like yeah it’s not much. 
 
And here is Eley’s field diary about walking with him from one of his organisation’s events 
to the nearest tram stop:  
 
James left a trail of stickers along the route that we walked. While he walked, he took the 
backing from the back of the stickers and placed them on objects along our path, 
including two bollards, and he left one unstuck on a car. He appeared calm and 
unconcerned with who may be watching him, not looking around or over his shoulder at 
all, for example to see if CCTV cameras or any individuals were watching him. He took 
care and time to place the stickers straight, by holding them at the corners, and then wiped 
his hand over the top to stick them securely. 
 
There are obvious differences in James and Adnan’s approaches to being surveilled, and 
Goffman’s account of the remedial interchanges that sometimes turn unfocused into focused 
interaction helps to systematise them. In remedial interchanges, says Goffman, it is important 
to distinguish between (a) an act and (b) its categorisation or not as an offence, and (c) the 
interaction following the act in which the moral status of the act and its perpetrator is 
negotiated (1971: 99, 102, 106). So when, for example, a person does something which 
appears to breach situational propriety (the deed), people in the vicinity are likely to display 
some concern, and it is how the actor then responds to their display – whether or not s/he 
appears repentant, convincingly disowns it, etc. – which determines whether the deed is 
  
12 
deemed inoffensive and normal order is restored, or whether further sanctions need to be 
pursued. Both Adnan and James are committed to the act of stickering, but in Adnan’s 
account, bystanders and CCTV watchers would object to the act and initiate an interaction 
that could lead to sanctions. Adnan’s concealment strategy was not only designed to hide the 
act but to provide him with a ready denial if held to account (“the sticker was already there”).  
In contrast, James didn’t think that anything could happen (no one would be watching CCTV 
and stickering wasn’t serious enough to pursue). But he did imagine other people reacting to 
his stickers, and this influenced where he placed them: he didn’t put them up on surfaces 
belonging to local and migrant-run businesses as “they’re… in the same bracket as us who 
are working class. They’re the people we wanna get on our side.” So overall, James worried 
less about being spotted doing something illegal than about creating a bad impression on 
people that he didn’t want to alienate. Comparing the two, Adnan’s concerns were much 
more immediate – being seen committing the act and being accused of an offence – and their 
differences are laid out in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of how Adnan and James anticipate the act of stickering  
leading to remedial interchanges 
 
a) who could observe the act and/or its outcomes, when?:  
        Adnan: CCTV cameras and ticket inspectors – now, during the emplacing 
  James:  nobody will be watching the CCTV; later on, local business and car owners,  
               cleaners 
 
b) what would they think of it?: 
  Adnan: CCTV operators & ticket inspectors – vandalism 
  James: CCTV operators – too minor to pursue; local car & business owners – a nuisance,  
               requiring time-consuming removal; cleaners – a work task   
 
c) what actions would they be likely to pursue if they spotted the act? 
  Adnan: CCTV operators & ticket inspectors – they’d pick you out and intervene, now or  
               later 
  James: CCTV operators – nothing; locals – scrape off the stickers, and think badly of the  
               project being publicised; cleaners – scrape them off  
 
d) what are the implications of all this for the here-and-now performance of the act? 
  Adnan: conceal the act of stickering, and be ready with a disclaimer 
  James: ignore the CCTV and carry on stickering as normal; don’t post stickers up on local  
businesses, or use adhesive on local cars; put them on surfaces that cleaners seldom  
             work on 
 
 
 
This difference no doubt partly reflects differences in their ethnicity and biographical 
experience: on other occasions, Adnan talked about racial profiling and encounters he had 
had with security personnel. But staying with the close-up exploration of experiences of 
surveillance, we can bring in Goffman’s notion of the Umwelt to differentiate Adnan’s 
perspective from James’. The Umwelt refers to “the sphere around the individual within 
which… potential sources of alarm are found” (1971: 297), and when stickering, Adnan’s 
sense of Umwelt threats was quite pressing. We can’t say for sure whether James’ Umwelt 
orientation was closer to Inge’s than Adnan’s when he was posting up stickers, but if we 
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bring Inge back into the account, we can differentiate experiences of surveillance more 
clearly.   
As Inge walked down the street, there was a ten second period when the gaze direction of 
another pedestrian and the sight of a scene in which there were uniformed men drew her 
attention, but there was no inkling of any untoward event, transgressive act, or perpetrator. 
More generally, other than the cars, oncoming pedestrians, and street furnishings that her 
dissociated vigilance helped her to avoid, there was little sense that Inge was watching out for 
particular threats or types of people who were likely to draw her into remedial interchanges. 
This was ambient monitoring in unfocused interaction, running along with a respectfully 
conducted side-involvement (humming), interspersed with noticings and scannings in search 
of her destination.   
 There was much more than dissociated vigilance or being “away” in the conduct that 
Adnan described. Rather than operating like Inge with a generalised awareness of whoever 
happened to be in the vicinity, Adnan was alert to the threat from very particular social types 
when he posted a sticker up – officials nearby or behind the CCTV – and he engaged in 
fabrication: “an intentional effort… to manage activity so that… others will be induced to 
have a false belief about what it is that is going on” (1974: 83). His actions appeared to take a 
determinate shape that he was able to reflect and report on, and if we combine this with 
concepts offered by Goffman, we can suggest a general structure for the experience of 
surveillance that Adnan described: 
 
i. the experience starts when an individual considers carrying out an act that they know is 
sometimes regarded as an offence;  
ii. s/he reckons with the Umwelt, and imagines co-present observers who are likely to see 
her/his act as an offence, to view him/her as a suspect, and to initiate particular kinds of 
remedial sequence (see Table 1); 
iii. s/he decides whether to abandon the act or go ahead with it, concentrating on body idiom 
to conceal it if they opt for the latter; 
iv. the experience ends either when he/she moves out of range of the observers and relaxes, 
or when the surveillers declare themselves, maybe in uniform or through a public address 
system, at which point some kind of synchronous focused interaction takes over (an 
arrest, a remedial interchange, etc.).6  
 
As a short-hand for this kind of experience of surveillance, with its heightened but 
disguised concern with surveilling bystanders, we can perhaps refer to Adnan’s only-
apparently unfocused conduct as “crypto-focused” interaction under surveillance, 
distinguishing this, on one hand, from the fluid and multi-track ambient monitoring in 
unfocused interaction that we saw with Inge, and on the other hand, from the kind of focused 
encounter with officials that his targeted concealment seeks to evade.   
Adnan’s conduct broadly matches the accounts of deception that feature most commonly 
when Goffman is cited in surveillance studies, but we have elaborated it here within a fuller 
account of unfocused interaction. Indeed, Goffman’s framework can also be extended to at 
least some of the everyday practices that arise at “the surfaces of contact or interfaces 
between… life-forms and webs of information,… between organs/body parts and 
entry/projection systems” (Bogard 1996: 33, cited in Ball 2005: 94), where human bodies 
intersect with surveillant technologies (Simon 2005: 17; Ball 2005, 2009; Ball and Wilson 
                                                             
6 There is another possibility: the surveilled address the surveillers, turning them into an 
audience - see Smith 2007: 293-4, 299. 
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2000; Lyon 2007: 164). This is demonstrated in Ole Pütz’s (2012) ethnographic study of 
scanning at an airport security check point, which is briefly discussed in the next section.  
 
 
4.  Close-up interaction with surveillance technology 
 
Pütz focuses on the brief but highly standardised process of preparing for an airport security 
check, stepping through a metal detector scanner, and being patted down by security staff if 
the scanner raises the alarm (2012: 164). This is a situation in which it is hard for travellers to 
ignore the fact that they are being actively surveilled as a potential security threat, but Pütz 
details the ways in which everyone intensifies the effort to act as if nothing untoward is 
happening. He notes that the closer passengers come to the checkpoint itself, the quieter they 
become, dropping conversation and turning off their cell phones (172). One adult enters the 
walk-through metal detector at a time and “if the scanner detects metallic objects, screeners 
must identify who raised the alarm and pat this traveller down to locate the source of the 
alarm on his body” (168). At this point, Pütz brings Goffman into the analysis, and proposes 
that this patting-down potentially violates the travellers’ personal space (cf. “territories of the 
self” in sec. 1). But the screeners and travellers conduct this “breach of personal space in a 
way that reduces the social implications of bodily proximity” (173). The screeners use a 
hand-metal detector, “a lifeless technical object”; they wear gloves so there is no skin to skin 
contact; and they avoid “private parts and do… not linger long on any part of the body” 
(173). The travellers who are stopped and patted down “avert their eyes while being patted 
down and focus visually on a point in the middle distance. They thus minimise the 
appearance of [focused] interaction, because eye contact is a clear indicator of [this]… [But 
they] do not fully avert the eye or stare dreamily into space; they are able to observe the 
situation out of the corner of the eye and stay cooperative” (173). 
In Goffman’s terms, this seems to be one of those “‘blind’ transactions, in which persons 
come together to accomplish a joint activity but do not bracket this spate of mutual 
coordination ritually, that is, do not sustain a social encounter,” which would involve “an 
exchange of words or other recognition rituals and the ratification of mutual participation in 
an open state of talk” (1971: 97; also 1963: 88ff.). Pütz uses the notion of civil inattention (cf. 
sec. 1) to explain the participants’ conduct at the scanner, and in fact remedial interchanges 
are also potentially relevant, since at this particular point of the security process, the unstated 
question motivating the scanning of bodies (and personal possessions) is: “Do you carry 
weapons or contraband which is a source of risk?” (2012: 169). This question is in principle 
potentially offensive to travellers, casting doubt on their character, and this may also 
contribute to the de-personalising avoidance strategies that Pütz outlines (2012: 175).7 
 This airport scene obviously differs in a number of ways from our characterisation of 
stickering. The surveillance technologies work differently: CCTV scans the street and picks 
out individuals, often differentiating them by age, ethnicity, gender as well as activity and 
appearance, whereas the step-through substance detector at the airport is used on all the 
passengers, regardless of social and personal identity. Stickerers vary in their interpretations 
of potential reactions to their acts of sticker emplacement, whereas in the airport scanner, a 
standardised interpretation of Umwelt risks takes over and governs everyone’s behaviour. 
And their orientations to remedial interchanges are different: the stickerers wanted to avoid 
them, whereas airport passengers were already drawn into a remedial sequence, positioned as 
suspects, and probed with technologies which investigated whether they were carrying 
                                                             
7 Rampton and Eley 2018: sec. 5 elaborate the possibilities in more detail.   
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material they shouldn’t. Even so, it looks as though Goffman’s account of unfocused 
interaction, remedial interchanges, and the Umwelt are relevant to both. 
 
5. Summary and conclusions 
 
Our discussion of scenes from everyday life has tried to show that Goffman’s work 
provides a multitude of empirical “entry points” into the (inter-) subjectively lived experience 
of surveillance, in all its “ubiquity and relative normalization” (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 
2012: 9). Pütz characterises the airport scanning process as a “non-event” because it does not 
acknowledge the passenger as an individual (2012: 158), and if we accept this, we can use 
Goffman to develop the following schematisation of the experiences of surveillance that we 
have considered. So to begin with, we have  
 
• focused interaction, which we can see, for example, whenever security staff abandon their 
surveillant position as overhearers/eavesdroppers and engage the (erstwhile) surveilled in 
a mutually acknowledged encounter such as a remedial interchange (as in stop-and-
search). Alternatively, the (formerly) surveilled act up to the cameras (Smith 2007).   
 
Then we have: 
 
• un-focused interaction, exemplified by Inge’s ambient awareness, her ease in an Umwelt 
characterised by normal appearances, doing nothing likely to provoke a remedial 
sequence, displaying only a very fleeting interest in uniformed personnel, taking 
surveillance for granted for the rest of the time;  
• crypto-focused interaction under surveillance, involving the appearance of unfocused 
interaction even though the actor’s attention and actions are directed towards co-present 
observers. This was Adnan, concealing his activity from the CCTV and uniformed 
personnel that he was now more acutely aware of, and was keen to avoid any remedial 
engagement with; 
 
and lastly with Pütz: 
 
• non-focused interaction under surveillance, involving surveillers and surveilled in a 
collaborative refusal to initiate a ritually ratified engagement, already finding themselves 
in a highly standardised remedial interchange, with the surveilled seeking to relinquish the 
status of suspect as soon as possible.  
 
The lines between these four types of interaction are obviously porous – un-, crypto-, and 
non-focused interaction can swiftly become focused, crypto- can slip back to unfocused, and 
so forth. And this list certainly isn’t offered as a comprehensive typology. But it does show 
that Goffman’s framework allows rather a differentiated account of the experience of 
surveillance, and at least in our own work, this carries three implications.  
First, one of the most obvious implications of our approach is to interrogate large-scale 
generalisations, providing resources with which to examine the manner and extent to which 
“technological innovations fundamentally alter the organisation, practice and effects of 
surveillance relationships” (Simon 2005: 1), changing “the dynamics of power, identity, 
institutional practice and interpersonal relations on a scale comparable to… industrialisation, 
globalisation and… the rise of urbanisation” (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 1). If some of 
the practices and relations that Goffman described in embodied interaction can be found in 
technologically mediated surveillance, then surveillance before and after technological 
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change can be compared, examining the alteration more closely. All the cases we have 
discussed involved at least partly embodied interaction, but the concepts we have used are 
also relevant to surveillance in entirely web-based communication (Jenkins 2010). For 
example, Marwick and boyd (2010; boyd and Marwick 2011; Marwick 2012) investigate US 
teenagers’ concerns about “social surveillance” by friends and family, arguing that social 
media present them with entirely new experiences of exposure because of on-line “context 
collapse.” Off-line, they suggest, “different social contexts are typically socially or 
temporally bounded, making the expected social role quite obvious [but] technology 
blurs the boundaries between formerly strict categories” (Marwick 2012: 386); “[s]ocial 
media technologies collapse multiple audiences into single contexts” (Marwick and boyd 
2010: 114). There is, though, a challenge to this in Goffman’s civil inattention (boyd and 
Marwick 2011: 25), deriving as it does from our ability to divide attention and handle the 
co-presence of a lot of different people as a matter of routine, managing a main 
involvement with ratified participants at the same time as disattending – but remaining 
alert to – others in the vicinity, known and unknown. In other words, the experience of 
public exposure notionally associated with context collapse isn’t exclusive to on-line 
environments, and it isn’t generally very problematic. Off- and on-line communication are 
obviously different, but with Goffman, we can investigate the differences with more specific 
questions, such as: what semiotic strategies and resources take the place of body idiom in 
displays of situational propriety in online gatherings? How far and in what ways does digital 
platform architecture provide new or different resources for concealing negatively 
sanctionable acts (involvement shields) and so forth (cf. Westlake 2008)? 
 Second, our study has implications for political interpretations of surveillance. Lyon, 
Haggerty, and Ball claim that “surveillance, although a normal everyday process in many 
contexts, is one which is inherently political: its very application constitutes a polity” 
(2012: 1). In an important though abstract sense, this is true in so far as control and 
influence are at stake. But whether or not the people involved in a surveillant relationship 
experience it as political – as oppressive, necessary, acceptable, or nothing of note – is 
subject to the kinds of variation we have described. If this variation is overlooked, there 
is a risk of losing the distinction between “intrusive forms of intelligence and pervasive 
forms of everyday surveillance, including inside the academic literature” (Bigo 2017: 3).  
Such a conflation of the intrusive and mundane has at least two effects. First (and of 
immediate concern to Bigo), a failure to distinguish the intrusive from the everyday can be 
used by professionals in the security field to “justify an extension of intrusive intelligence” 
(Bigo 2017: 3), bolstering this with the claim that as a pervasive feature of daily life, people 
aren’t worried about surveillance. Second, if it is all seen as intrusive, there is a temptation 
for research on everyday experiences of surveillance to emphasise resistance: “closing 
blinds, shredding documents, purchasing anti-surveillance devices, or learning how to ‘hide 
in the light’” (Lyon, Haggerty, and Ball 2012: 4; Marx 2009). But how accurately would this 
view of agentive practice capture Inge’s experience of surveillance, and how closely does it 
apply to the ways that security personnel and travellers collaborate in the production of 
unfocused interaction at the airport scanner?   
Last, our analysis has implications for the theorisation of surveillance itself, which we can 
tie to one of Green and Zurawski’s central questions: Can surveillance be seen as a basic 
mode of sociality that is elaborated in different ways in different environments – surveillance 
as “a dimension of the social” that becomes “manifest in other activities and practices” that 
are perceived (or not) as such (2015: 29, 35; also Simon 2005)? Our answer is “yes”. 
Unfocused interaction involves: being alert to others beyond the task or encounter that you’re 
focused on, and knowing you’re also visible to them; styling your conduct and outward 
appearance to conform to the proprieties of the situation, restricting intrusive gazes either 
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way with civil inattention; and shifting to direct engagement only if you can display benign 
intent or there’s some un-ignorable infraction. Most if not all these forms of awareness, 
practices, and concerns seem fundamental to sociality, and in the three case studies that we 
have cited, we have seen how different ways of enacting unfocused interaction contribute to 
the normalisation of institutional surveillance, as well as to the ways in which sharper 
experiences of being surveilled are differently configured.   
In surveillance studies, Foucault’s panopticon has been a cardinal reference point (1977).  
In contrast, Goffman’s work has made only a rather minor contribution, being drawn into the 
description of how subordinates cope, often with references to Goffman’s early work on 
impression management and Asylums (1959, 1961). But as we have tried to show, Goffman 
has a much broader view of interaction, seeing it as a fundamental form of sociality, and 
contemporary developments are likely to increase the relevance of this perspective. In 
Foucault’s panopticon, the inmate “is seen, but he does not see; he is the object of 
information, never a subject in communication” (1977: 200). Goffman also wrote a great deal 
about people being the objects of information, but his starting assumption was that even 
though people’s agendas and constraints might be very different, this monitoring is mutual. 
Seen from this vantage point, the panopticon looks like an attempt to limit and restructure 
interactional capacities and practices of the kind we have discussed – indeed, in the C17th 
plague prevention order with which Foucault opens his account of panopticism, there is 
lockdown and a ban on gatherings, a primary site of unfocused interaction (1977: 195). More 
recently, however, the view has been growing that the panopticon is no longer adequate as a 
model of contemporary control (Deleuze 1992; Fraser 2003; Rampton 2016). Haggerty, for 
example, speaks of “[t]ear[ing] down the walls… demolishing the panopticon” (2006: title), 
and like others, he opts instead for Foucault’s notion of governmentality, allowing more 
scope for the activity of the governed: “while governance inevitably involves efforts to 
persuade, entice, coerce or cajole subjects to modify their behaviour in particular directions, 
the targets of governance are understood to be a locus of freedom… subjects as active 
agents” (2006: 40). Haggerty conceptualises this interactional agency more narrowly than we 
suggest, prioritising “resistance, avoidance or subversion” (ibid.). Even so, if Goffman is 
given the kind of broader reading that we have attempted, his work can serve as a central 
point of departure for investigation of the everyday enactment and experience of surveillance 
in contemporary life. 
 
 
-------------------- 
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